



Avoidable “Fraccident”: An Argument Against 
Strict Liability for Hydraulic Fracturing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hydraulic fracturing, also known as “fracking,” recently has grabbed 
the attention of headlines,1 filmmakers,2 and even late night comedians.3  
The reason is a revolution in unconventional “shale gas” drilling.4  Shale 
gas is natural gas trapped in deep, impermeable shale rock formations; 
fracking is essential to its cost-effective production.5  The United States 
increasingly relies on these unconventional sources of natural gas for its 
energy needs.6  Therefore, the United States increasingly relies on 
fracking. 
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 1. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Baffled About Fracking? You’re Not Alone, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/13/13greenwire-baffled-about-fracking-youre-not-
alone-44383.html?pagewanted=1&sq=fracking&st=cse&scp=2 (discussing the recent controversy 
and media coverage of hydraulic fracturing). 
 2. See, e.g., GASLAND (New Video Group 2010). 
 3. See, e.g., The Colbert Report: Anti-Frack Attacks (Comedy Central television broadcast 
July 11, 2011), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/391552/july-11-
2011/anti-frack-attack. 
 4. See, e.g., David Greene, Daniel Yergin Examines America’s ‘Quest’ for Energy, NPR (Sept. 
20, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/20/140606249/daniel-yergin-examines-americas-quest-for-
energy. 
 5. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 6 (2011) [hereinafter POTENTIAL 
IMPACTS OF FRACTURING], available at http://o.aolcdn.com/os/industry/energy/photos/EPA-
Hydraulic-Fracturing-Draft-Plan.pdf. 
 6. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A PRIMER 8–9 (2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/ 
EPreports/Shale_Gas_Primer_2009.pdf (explaining that unconventional sources of natural gas, such 
as shale gas, are likely to contribute significantly to the United States’ domestic energy needs). 
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Fracking is the pressurized injection of water, sand, chemicals, and 
organic molecules into oil and gas formations.7  The pressure creates 
fractures in the formations, which act as conduits for oil and gas to flow 
into the well.8  For over half a century, well operators have used fracking 
as “a very common” method of increasing the rate and lifetime of wells’ 
production.9  Recently, fracking’s safety has been called into question.  
Skeptics urge that fracking causes underground gases and fracking 
chemicals to contaminate underground sources of drinking water 
(USDW).10  These concerns are most prevalent in states like New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia, which hold the 
nation’s most potentially productive gas shale reserves.11 
The question of fracking’s environmental safety has percolated to the 
courts.  Plaintiffs in fracking cases have alleged that fracking has 
contaminated their domestic water sources with natural gases or fracking 
chemicals.12  Because environmental contamination statutes typically do 
                                                          
 7. NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION, 
DRILLING, AND PRODUCTION 423–24 (2d ed. 2001). 
 8. Id. at 422–23. 
 9. See id. at 425 (noting that at least half of all gas wells and nearly one-third of all oil wells 
drilled in the United States are fracked). 
 10. Sarah Hoye, ‘Fracking’ Protestors Say Drilling Jobs Not Worth Environmental Risks, CNN 
(Sept. 20, 2011, 8:58 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/09/20/philadelphia.fracking.protests/.  
Experts in Ohio also worry that the underground disposal of fracking fluids caused a recent 4.0 
magnitude earthquake.  Kim Palmer, Ohio Earthquake Was Not a Natural Event, Expert Says, 
REUTERS, (Jan. 3 2012, 7:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/04/us-earthquake-ohio-
idUSTRE80302220120104. 
 11. Hoye, supra note 10.  Fracking is increasingly prevalent in states like Kansas, as well, 
where new horizontal fracking techniques can revitalize older fields.  Roxana Hegeman, New 
Technologies Put Kansas on Cusp of Oil Boom, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 8, 2012, 
http://www.kansascity.com/2012/04/08/3542980/new-technologies-put-kansas-on.html.  In Kansas, 
the relatively robust state regulatory agency cannot keep up with a 300% increase in permits for 
horizontal fracking.  Christina Marie, Kansas Seeks to Beef Up Budget to Deal With Fracking, KAN. 
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2012), http://kansaspublicradio.org/news/1769-kansas-seeks-to-beef-up-
budget-to-deal-with-fracking.  One could predict that an increase in complaints of groundwater 
contamination will accompany the rise in fracking. 
 12. See, e.g., Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (noting 
that plaintiffs alleged “pollutants and other industrial waste, including the fracking fluid and other 
hazardous chemicals such as barium and strontium, were discharged into the ground and 
contaminated the water supply used by the Plaintiffs”); Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. 
Supp. 2d 506, 509 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants improperly conducted 
hydrofracturing and other natural gas production activities that allowed the release of methane, 
natural gas, and other toxins onto Plaintiffs’ land and into their groundwater.” (footnote omitted)).  
For more cases in which plaintiffs allege groundwater contamination or personal injury from 
fracking activities, see Bombardiere v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 1:11-CV-50, 2011 WL 
2443691, *1 (N.D. W. Va. June 14, 2011); Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 1, Parr v. Aruba 
Petroleum, Inc., No. 11-02650-E (Dallas Cnty. Ct. March 8, 2011); Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 
3–4, Mitchell v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 3:10-CV-02555-L (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2010); 
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not apply to petroleum pollution, and provide for only remediation costs 
when they do, these plaintiffs assert common law tort claims.13  
Specifically, plaintiffs in fracking cases tend to claim common law 
trespass, nuisance, and strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities.14  This Comment examines plaintiffs’ strict liability claims for 
injuries arising as a result of fracking.  Trespass, unlike strict liability, 
has received ample treatment from the academy15 and, recently, the 
courts.16  The law, though not settled, is at least thoroughly analyzed.  
Nuisance and strict liability claims are not.  The laws of nuisance and 
strict liability intersect and overlap so as to lead many courts to analyze 
them together.17  Therefore, much of this Comment’s analysis is germane 
to both claims. 
Whether fracking is an abnormally dangerous activity for purposes 
of strict liability appears to be an issue of first impression.  That larger 
issue primarily turns on a smaller one: whether fracking accidents—or 
“fraccidents”—are avoidable or unavoidable.  To that end, this Comment 
argues that when practiced with reasonable care and in the vicinity of 
                                                                                                                       
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 2–3, Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 4:10-CV-00708-MHS-
ALM (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2010). 
To date, no plaintiff has claimed damages from a fracking-induced earthquake.  Because only 
the disposal of fluids from fracking—not fracking itself—has been linked to earthquakes, this 
Comment does not attempt to analyze liability for such earthquakes.  Rather, the issue of liability for 
fluid injection and waste disposal is separate from strict liability for fracking, which is presented 
here.  For a study of liability for earthquakes induced by fluid injection, waste disposal, and 
secondary oil and gas recovery, see Darlene A. Cypser & Scott D. Davis, Liability For Induced 
Earthquakes, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 551 (1994). 
 13. See Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on 
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 904–05, 925–
26 (2004) (identifying the limitations of federal environmental statutes, including their 
inapplicability to petroleum and limited damage rewards).  For a detailed discussion of common law 
actions against polluters, including oil and gas polluters, see Robert L. Glicksman, A Guide to 
Kansas Common Law Actions Against Industrial Pollution Sources, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 621 (1985). 
 14. See, e.g., Berish, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (noting the various claims that plaintiffs alleged); 
Fiorentino, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (same). 
 15. See, e.g., Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface Is Not His 
Castle, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 250 (2010) (arguing that “[a] land or mineral owner should not be 
permitted to recover money damages for mere loss of speculative value resulting from a subsurface 
trespass”). 
 16. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2008) 
(holding that the rule of capture precludes trespass claims for damages for drainage by fracking). 
 17. E.g., Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1975) (recognizing 
that strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities and private nuisance are conceptually 
similar—maybe even identical—enough to be “amalgamated”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 520 cmt. c (1977) (noting the conceptual similarities between nuisance and strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities). 
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other petroleum production, fraccidents are avoidable, and thus, fracking 
is not abnormally dangerous.  Instead of strict liability, courts should 
combine a negligence standard with res ipsa loquitur to determine 
liability of fracking companies that contaminate water sources. 
Part II.A of this Comment will present background on the process 
and known environmental impact of fracking.  Part II.B will survey the 
development and current laws of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities, negligence, and res ipsa loquitur.  Part III will then apply the 
Second Restatement of Torts’ factors of strict liability to fracking.  Part 
IV will conclude with recommendations for courts to apply res ipsa 
loquitur in fracking cases. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Hydraulic Fracturing: Description, History, and Environmental 
Impact 
An analysis of whether fracking qualifies as an abnormally 
dangerous activity should start with a background survey both of 
fracking and strict liability jurisprudence.  Therefore, this section will 
discuss both subjects separately, beginning with fracking.  Fracking is a 
highly technical process of oil- and gas-well stimulation.18  The 
engineering theories and formulae that underlie fracking are beyond the 
scope of this discussion.19  A mere survey of the history, basic methods, 
and environmental impacts of fracking suffices as background for an 
analysis of whether the activity is abnormally dangerous as a matter of 
law. 
1. Description and History of Fracking 
Fracking is a standard method for stimulating greater production of 
oil and gas from wells.20  The process, often called a “frac job,”21 creates 
and preserves cracks or fractures in underground rock formations that 
hold oil and gas reserves.22  The otherwise trapped oil and gas in these 
                                                          
 18. See generally HYNE, supra note 7, at 423–26. 
 19. For a detailed discussion of the theoretical and technical foundations of fracking, see 2 G.C. 
HOWARD & C.R. FAST, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (Henry L. Doherty ed., 1970). 
 20. Id. § 2.1. 
 21. HYNE, supra note 7, at 424. 
 22. HOWARD & FAST, supra note 19, § 2.1. 
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formations drains through the fractures into the well bore, allowing the 
well operators to pump it to the surface.23  In essence, fracking opens up 
space in petroleum-producing formations.24  That space allows oil and 
gas to pass into the well at a greater rate and in greater quantities.25 
Gas production companies developed fracking in the Hugoton field 
of western Kansas in 194726 as a safer and more effective method to 
stimulate natural gas wells.27  The process has since matured into an 
industry standard and has proliferated across the United States.28  The 
National Petroleum Council has estimated that natural gas producers will 
frac eight out of ten natural gas wells they drill in the coming five 
years.29 
2. The Fracking Process 
Fracking’s primary application is to increase well productivity, 
though other applications exist.30  Regardless of its specific purpose, 
fracking proceeds in three basic steps.31  First, several large pump trucks 
inject a pad of “frac fluid” into the subject well.32  Frac fluid is a viscous 
gel made up of over 90% water mixed with chemical polymers.33  The 
pad is injected at a higher rate than the rock formation can accept, 
                                                          
 23. Id. § 1.6. 
 24. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WHITE PAPER A-1 (2004) [hereinafter 
DOE WHITE PAPER 2004], available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ 
append_a_doe_whitepaper.pdf. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.; HOWARD & FAST, supra note 19, § 1.5. 
 27. See HOWARD & FAST, supra note 19, § 1.3 (noting that other methods were more 
dangerous). 
 28. HYNE, supra note 7, at 425. 
 29. James M. Inhofe & Frank Fannon, Energy and the Environment: The Future of Natural 
Gas in America, 26 ENERGY L.J. 349, 370 (2005). 
 30. DOE WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 24, at A-1 to A-2.  Fracking also may (1) “[i]ncrease 
the flow rate of oil and/or gas from low permeability reservoirs,” (2) “[i]ncrease the flow rate of oil 
and/or gas from wells that have been damaged,” (3) “[c]onnect the natural fractures and/or cleats in a 
formation to the wellbore,” (4) “[d]ecrease the pressure drop around the well to minimize problems 
with asphaltine and/or paraffin deposition,” (5) “[i]ncrease the area of drainage or the amount of 
formation in contact with the wellbore,” and (6) “[c]onnect the full vertical extent of a reservoir to a 
slanted or horizontal well.”  Id. at A-2. 
 31. HYNE, supra note 7, at 424. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 423; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND 
SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 
4-2 (2004) [hereinafter EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004]. 
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causing the formation to crack.34  The specific chemicals used in frac 
fluid vary from job to job.35  Some of these fluids may cause negative 
human health effects in their pure form.36  The same chemicals in frac 
fluids, however, are significantly diluted by water37 and are toxic only 
through direct inhalation, ingestion, or skin contact.38 
As the initial fractures widen, treatment proceeds to the second step: 
injecting propping agents, or proppants, into the well with the frac 
fluid.39  Proppants are tiny spheres intended to hold open the fractures 
permanently.40  Sand is the most common proppant; ceramic beads 
sometimes hold open deeper formations.41 
The third and final stage of fracking is known as back flush or flow 
back.42  In this stage, pumps bring the frac fluid back to surface, leaving 
the proppants behind.43  Back flush typically retrieves up to 80% of frac 
fluids from underground.44  Wells may undergo fracking multiple times, 
using differing types and amounts of frac fluids and proppants.45 
3. Environmental Impact of Fracking 
Recent concerns over the environmental impact of fracking are not 
novel.  Generally, plaintiffs in fracking litigation allege that frac fluids 
and formation gases have contaminated their USDW.46  In 2004, a series 
of similar allegations led the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
study the potential for frac fluids from the fracking of coalbed methane 
wells to contaminate USDW.47  The EPA “concluded that the injection of 
                                                          
 34. DOE WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 24, at A-1. 
 35. See EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 3-5 (discussing a variety of 
chemicals comprising hydraulic fracturing fluids). 
 36. Id. at 4-3, 4-10 tbl. 4-1.  When present in harmful concentrations, these chemicals can cause 
a range of health effects in humans, including mild skin and eye irritation, nausea, diarrhea and 
abdominal pain, severe burns and tissue damage, “heritable genetic damage,” internal organ damage, 
and cancer.  Id. at 4-10 tbl. 4-1. 
 37. Id. at 4-3. 
 38. Id. at 4-17, 4-10 tbl. 4-1. 
 39. HYNE, supra note 7, at 424. 
 40. Id. 
 41. DOE WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 24, at A-1. 
 42. HYNE, supra note 7, at 424. 
 43. Id. 
 44. EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 4-15. 
 45. HYNE, supra note 7, at 426. 
 46. See, e.g., cases and sources cited supra note 12. 
 47. EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 1-2. 
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hydraulic fracturing fluids into coalbed methane wells poses little or no 
threat to USDW.”48  Importantly, though, shale and other natural gas 
formations sit much deeper underground than coalbed methane 
formations and are geologically separated from drinking water sources 
by thousands of feet of rock.49 
Concerns over drinking water contamination rest on the potential for 
frac fluids or formation gases to communicate with an underground 
water supply through fractures created by fracking.50  Indeed, most 
formations fracture vertically,51 making communication between a 
shallow aquifer and a much deeper petroleum formation hypothetically 
possible.52  The EPA planned a multi-phase study to investigate this 
possibility.53  In Phase I, the EPA conducted a literature review of 
existing fracking science and coal basin geology, requested information 
from state regulatory agencies and the public about groundwater 
contamination believed to be from fracking, reviewed reports of 
contamination, and “[c]onducted field visits” of coalbed methane 
fields.54  Phase II would have included a site-specific, detailed study of 
contamination complaints,55 but because Phase I concluded that no 
evidence existed directly linking fracking to water quality degradation, 
Phase II never occurred.56 
The EPA found that the risk of frac fluid migration into underground 
water supplies is significantly reduced by three factors: (1) the 
concentration and flow back of fluids; (2) underground mitigating 
effects; and (3) dense geological barriers.57  The EPA concluded that the 
low concentration of potentially toxic chemicals in frac fluids,58 coupled 
                                                          
 48. See id. at 7-5. 
 49. J. DANIEL ARTHUR, BRIAN BOHM & MARK LAYNE, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATURAL GAS WELLS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE 4 (2008), available at 
www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf. 
 50. EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 1-6. 
 51. DOE WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 24, at A-1. 
 52. EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 7-4 (acknowledging that “[d]eep vertical 
fractures can propagate vertically to shallower depths and develop a horizontal component” and 
noting that deeper reservoirs tend to fracture vertically). 
 53. See id. at 1-7. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 7-5. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 4-3 (acknowledging that “fluid and fluid additives may contain constituents of 
potential concern,” but also noting that the constituents are “significantly diluted”). 
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with effective fluid recovery practices,59 significantly reduced any risk to 
water supplies.  Dilution, dispersion, and diffusion by groundwater, 
adsorption by the formation rock, and even biodegradation mitigate the 
risks posed by frac fluids that flow back does not recover.60 
The EPA further concluded that a thick shale formation would act as 
a barrier to confine the growth of fractures, thereby protecting water 
supplies from fracking.61  Shale has low permeability and is a solid—not 
porous or fractured—rock formation.62  These properties make shale an 
effective barrier to fracture growth and frac fluid migration.63  Thousands 
of feet—typically a mile or more—of shale and other formation rocks 
isolate fracked formations from shallower fresh water aquifers.64  Put 
simply, shale formations shield underground water supplies from the 
effects of fracking.  Shale provides another method of defense against 
frac fluid migration because it is “usually [chemically] reactive with 
water-based fluids.”65  Water reacts with shale to “form an increasingly 
viscous, dehydrated slurry within the fracture, which will eventually seal 
the fracture over a long time period.”66  As a result, water-based fluids—
like frac fluids—cannot migrate through shale.67 
The EPA also determined that sources other than fracking caused 
reports of methane and hydrogen sulfide gases in water supplies.68  
Evidence showed that these gases entered drinking water sources through 
naturally occurring fractures,69 improperly sealed natural gas wells, and 
negligently abandoned gas wells.70  Plugging and sealing old gas wells 
has apparently mitigated the problem in New Mexico, suggesting that 
existing gas production, gas drilling, and natural fractures cause 
                                                          
 59. See id. at 4-15 (noting a 61% recovery in one study). 
 60. Id. at 4-16 to 4-17. 
 61. Id. at 7-4. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. ARTHUR, BOHM & LAYNE, supra note 49, at 2 tbl. 1. 
 65. A.K. Wojtanowicz, Environmental Control Technology in Petroleum Drilling and 
Production, in ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 73, 140 (S.T. Orszulik ed., 
1997). 
 66. Id. (describing shale’s reactivity with water-based fluids in the context of injected oilfield 
waste slurries, which are analogous to frac fluids). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 6-2 to 6-3, 6-8 (describing 
complaints concerning alleged methane and hydrogen sulfide in water wells and concluding that 
“[n]o reports provide direct information regarding hydraulic fracturing”). 
 69. Id. 6-8. 
 70. Id. at 6-1 to 6-2. 
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groundwater pollution—not fracking.71 
The EPA has initiated a second investigation of fracking to uncover 
any potential impacts of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water and 
groundwater.72  According to the EPA, the recent expansion and 
forecasted growth of natural gas exploration in “hard-to-extract sources” 
warrants further study of fracking.73  Though the EPA will not publish a 
full report until late in 2012, and the final report not until 2014,74 the 
agency in late 2011 released a draft report of its findings from an 
investigation of groundwater contamination in the Pavillion Gas Field of 
Wyoming.75  The draft report theorized a link between fracking and 
groundwater contamination.76  The EPA conducted the study by 
collecting groundwater samples and drilling two monitoring wells.77  The 
resulting data indicated the presence of contamination from shallow 
surface sources, such as oil field pits and “deep sources of 
contamination,”78 but urged further investigation to determine whether 
organic contaminants associated with fracking have contaminated 
domestic water wells.79  Among the EPA’s reasons for linking fracking 
with the contamination was that fracking in Pavillion happened in “thin 
discontinuous sandstone” formations, which failed to effectively shield 
water sources.80  The EPA further found that many wells lacked adequate 
cement casing to protect the well from surrounding water sources.81  
Ultimately, the EPA recommended more data collection and greater 
emphasis on well construction and integrity.82  Implementing these 
recommendations, the EPA stated, “would decrease the likelihood of 
                                                          
 71. See id. at 7-2 (discussing New Mexico’s “plugging and abandonment program”); see also 
Soraghan, supra note 1 (noting recent controversy over and media coverage of hydraulic fracturing). 
 72. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF FRACTURING, supra note 5, at 1. 
 73. Questions and Answers About EPA’s Hydraulic Fracturing Study?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/questions.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2012). 
 74. EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water 
Resources, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/ (last updated Mar. 19, 2012). 
 75. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT, INVESTIGATION OF GROUND WATER 
CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING (2011) available at http://www.epa.gov/region8/ 
superfund/wy/pavillion/EPA_ReportOnPavillion_Dec-8-2011.pdf [hereinafter EPA USDW 
EVALUATION DRAFT 2011]. 
 76. Id. at 33, 39. 
 77. Id. at 5. 
 78. Id. at 33. 
 79. Id. at 39. 
 80. See id. at 37. 
 81. Id. at 38. 
 82. Id. at 39. 
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impact to ground water” from fracking.83 
                                                          
 83. Id. 
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The Governor of Wyoming and the natural gas industry have 
criticized the validity of the EPA’s draft report.84  In particular, critics 
fear that the EPA will not “‘give deference to the unique geology and 
hydrology’ in the Pavillion [field].”85  The Pavillion field is a relatively 
shallow coalbed methane field.86  Coalbed methane fields are unique 
because their shallow geology requires fracking directly into USDWs.87  
In contrast, typical natural gas recovery through fracking occurs at much 
greater depths relative to USDW.88  The EPA’s theory in the draft report 
is, arguably, inapplicable outside of coalbed methane fields because 
unconventional shale plays in Pennsylvania, New York, and Tennessee,89 
for example, have significantly different geology than the coalbed field 
in the Pavillion study.90 
B. The Development of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous 
Activities 
This section surveys the development of the doctrine of strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities.  It will briefly trace the 
doctrine’s evolution into its modern form, established in Rylands v. 
Fletcher,91 to its treatment in the First and Second Restatements of Torts.  
Lastly, this section will discuss negligence and res ipsa loquitur as 
alternatives to strict liability. 
                                                          
 84. Group: Wyo. Siding With Industry on Fracking Issue, CBSNEWS (Jan. 28, 2012, 11:10 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505245_162-57361077/group-wyo-siding-with-industry-on-
fracking-issue/. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See EPA USDW EVALUATION DRAFT 2011, supra note 75, at 1–2 (explaining that fracking 
in the field occurred at depths “as shallow as 372 m (1220 ft.)”). 
 87. Id. at 39 (citing EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33). 
 88. ARTHUR, BOHM & LAYNE, supra note 49, at 3 (noting that gas bearing shale can sit below 
12,000 feet). 
 89. See Hoye, supra note 10 (discussing the location of unconventional shale plays, which are 
not coalbed methane producers). 
 90. See EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 7-4 (“Most coal seams currently 
used for methane production are relatively shallow compared to [other] conventional . . . production 
wells . . . .”). 
 91. (1866) 1 L.R. Ex. 265, aff’d by, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
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1. The Origins of Strict Liability 
Modern negligence and strict liability emerged in the Industrial 
Revolution.92  Strict liability means liability despite intent or 
negligence.93  In 1850, just one year before Brown v. Kendall announced 
the modern concept of negligence,94 New York’s highest court laid down 
the rule of strict liability for blasting in Hay v. Cohoes Co.95  The rule 
allowed plaintiffs to recover damages caused by a defendant’s blasting 
operations without proving negligence.96  The Hay rule was influential 
but limited to the use of explosives. 97  Today’s concept of strict liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities cuts a wider swath. 
Today’s strict liability rule originated in the famous 1868 English 
case of Rylands v. Fletcher.98  In Rylands, the defendant had built and 
maintained on his land a fresh water reservoir.99  The reservoir filled and 
burst, sending massive amounts of water through ancient underground 
coal shafts and into the plaintiff’s neighboring coalmine.100  The 
Exchequer Chamber held the defendant liable even though he was 
unaware of the ancient mineshafts beneath his reservoir and was 
otherwise not negligent.101  Justice Blackburn explained the rule: 
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own 
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything 
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he 
does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is 
the natural consequence of its escape . . . .102 
Lord Cairns affirmed the Exchequer’s decision and ratified Justice 
Blackburn’s principle, but he included an important limitation: that an 
activity must also constitute a “non-natural use” of the land.103  
                                                          
 92. FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 4 (1989). 
 93. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 75, at 534 (5th ed. 1984). 
 94. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 297–98 (1850). 
 95. 2 N.Y. 159, 161–67 (1849). 
 96. Id. at 163. 
 97. VANDALL, supra note 92, at 5–6. 
 98. (1866) 1 L.R. Ex. 265, aff’d by, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
 99. Id. at 278. 
 100. Id. at 278–79. 
 101. Id. at 279–80. 
 102. Id. at 279. 
 103. Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence 
Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 603–05 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Therefore, the Rylands rule imposes liability on a defendant who 
damages his neighbor “by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and 
inappropriate to the place where it is maintained, in the light of the 
character of that place and its surroundings,” even if the defendant was 
not negligent.104 
Courts in the United States initially gave a mixed interpretation to 
the Rylands principle.105  Courts that rejected the rule reasoned that it 
“place[d] too heavy a burden on [the country’s] industrial 
development.”106  In 1873, New York’s high court in Losee v. Buchanan 
articulated this notion with particular clarity: 
We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals[,] and railroads. They 
are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of 
all our civilization.  If I have any of these upon my lands, and they are 
not a nuisance and are not so managed as to become such, I am not 
responsible for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my 
neighbor.  He receives his compensation for such damage by the 
general good, in which he shares, and the right which he has to place 
the same things upon his lands.107 
Decisions like this hewed closely to the “subsidy theory,” which argues 
that negligence subsidizes industry by immunizing it from liability for 
accidental harm to others.108 
The U.S. courts that adopted the Rylands rule did so largely under 
the theory of “enterprise liability.”109  Under this theory, business 
enterprises are made to insure others from any injury or harm resulting 
from the enterprises’ activities.110  Minnesota led the charge for 
enterprise liability in the 1924 case of Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of 
Duluth.111  The Minnesota Supreme Court stated the definition of 
enterprise liability: “In such a case, even though negligence be absent, 
natural justice would seem to demand that the enterprise . . . should stand 
                                                          
 104. KEETON ET AL., supra note 93, § 78, at 547–48. 
 105. See Boston, supra note 103, at 604 (gathering cases). 
 106. Klass, supra note 13, at 909. 
 107. 51 N.Y. 476, 484–85 (1873). 
 108. VANDALL, supra note 92, at 4–5. 
 109. See Klass, supra note 13, at 911 (citing Bridgemean-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197 
N.W. 971, 972–73 (Minn. 1924)). 
 110. James A. Henderson Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 380 
(2002). 
 111. 197 N.W. 971. 
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the loss rather than the individual.  It is too heavy a burden upon one.”112  
The Losee and Bridgeman-Russell cases illustrate the clash between 
enterprise subsidy and enterprise liability.113  “[T]he debate over the 
“benefits and burdens of ‘enterprise’ liability for hazardous activities . . . 
continues today.”114 
2. Strict Liability in the Restatements of Torts 
a. The First Restatement 
Today, most courts follow the doctrine of strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities articulated in the Restatement of 
Torts.115  Professor Francis Bohlen reported the Restatement of Torts in 
1938,116 when the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities was still limited to the Rylands rule.117  Despite this fact—
perhaps, in spite of it—Professor Bohlen proposed a comparatively broad 
rule of strict liability in the Restatement.118  The rule called for strict 
liability for “ultrahazardous activities.”119  Ultrahazardous activities have 
two necessary elements.120  First, such an activity must “necessarily 
involve[] a risk of serious harm to the person, land[,] or chattels of others 
[that] cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care.”121  
Second, such an activity must “not [be] a matter of common usage.”122  
Essentially, an activity qualifies as ultrahazardous if its utility “does not 
justify the risk inseparable from it.”123 
Professor Bohlen’s ultrahazardous standard was broader than the 
Rylands rule in two primary ways.124  First, the “non-natural us[e]” 
element of the Rylands test gave way for the “matter of common usage” 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 972. 
 113. See text accompanying notes 106–07 and 110–11. 
 114. Klass, supra note 13, at 911. 
 115. Id. at 912. 
 116. Boston, supra note 103, at 604–05. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938). 
 120. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520. 
 121. Id. § 520(a). 
 122. Id. § 520(b). 
 123. Id. § 520 cmt. a. 
 124. See Boston, supra note 103, at 605–06. 
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element of ultrahazardous activities.125  The common usage provision 
apparently extended strict liability to activities that are not “customarily 
carried on by the great mass of mankind.”126  Second, the ultrahazardous 
principle expanded the definition of “land.”127  The facts of Rylands 
limited defendant’s liability to adjacent landowners.128  The 
ultrahazardous principle extends a defendant’s liability to any person 
harmed by his use of dangerous instrumentalities or operations.129  The 
Restatement further departed from Rylands by requiring an activity to be 
“unavoidably” dangerous,130 such that it involves a risk that “cannot be 
eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care.”131 
b. The Second Restatement 
One of the ultrahazardous rule’s harshest critics, Dean William 
Prosser, was the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts.132  The 
law of strict liability underwent another sea of change when American 
Law Institute published the Second Restatement in 1977.133  The Second 
Restatement replaced “ultrahazardous” with “abnormally dangerous.”134  
The new name accompanied a new set of criteria to identify those 
activities that qualify for strict liability—the six-factor test in section 
520:135 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land 
or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; 
and 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 605. 
 126. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. e. 
 127. See Boston, supra note 103, at 605–06. 
 128. Id. at 605. 
 129. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmts. b–d. 
 130. Id. § 520 cmt. a; see also Boston, supra note 103, at 612 (noting that Bohlen’s comment 
that the inherent dangers of air travel made it dangerous corroborates the existence of this new 
requirement). 
 131. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(b). 
 132. Boston, supra note 103, at 616. 
 133. Klass, supra note 13, at 916. 
 134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). 
 135. Klass, supra note 13, at 914. 
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(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerous attributes.136 
Dean Prosser explained that shifting to a factors test was necessary 
because defining “abnormally dangerous” to “cover the myriad kind of 
cases potentially involved’’ would be impossible.137 
The Second Restatement’s test has faced serious scrutiny from 
academics, in particular, Professor Gerald Boston.  Professor Boston 
asserts that the negligence system has obviated the doctrine of strict 
liability as it has been interpreted.138  Professor Boston further argues that 
the factors in section 520 create inconsistent results, which promote 
litigation.139 
In his analysis, Professor Boston identifies a number of signature 
characteristics of the factors in section 520.  First, factor (e) seems to 
reincorporate the “appropriateness of the activity to its surroundings”—
essentially, Lord Cairns’ “non-natural” rule—into the analysis.140  Factor 
(d) also reincorporates the “common usage” requirement from the First 
Restatement.141  The Second Restatement’s comments explain how these 
factors interact using the example of oil wells, noting that “[t]he dangers 
incident to the operation [of oil wells] are characteristic of oil lands and 
not of lands in general.”142  As comment j states, however, oil wells are 
appropriate when located “where there is oil.”143  The comments resolve 
this tension using factor (f), which states that “a properly conducted oil 
or gas well, at least in a rural area, is not regarded as abnormally 
dangerous” because of its value to the community.144  Apparently, Dean 
Prosser intended section 520 to accomplish this sort of balancing of 
countervailing factors. 
Another notable quality of section 520 is that no factor is supposed 
                                                          
 136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520. 
 137. Boston, supra note 103, at 620 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 21, at 72 
(Council Draft No. 15, 1963)). 
 138. Boston, supra note 103, at 598. 
 139. Id. at 627 (examining Page Keeton’s criticism of Prosser’s factors test, including that the 
test promotes litigation by creating inconsistent results). 
 140. See id. at 624; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 93, § 78, at 547–48 (stating Lord Cairns’ 
rule that strict liability applies when an activity occurs in an area to which it is not naturally suited). 
 141. See Boston, supra note 103, at 659–61 (discussing interpretations of factor (d) that include 
the “common usage” requirement); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938). 
 142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i. 
 143. Id. § 520 cmt. j. 
 144. Id. § 520 cmt. k. 
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to be determinative.145  That rule has not been borne out by the case 
law.146  Instead, Professor Boston claims that courts tend to avoid the 
mire of balancing factors (d), (e), and (f) by deciding cases based on (a) 
and (b), or, more often, (c).147  As a practical matter, courts tend to apply 
strict liability when these factors—in particular, factor (c)—weigh in 
favor of such application.148 
Factor (c) retains the spirit of the requirement that the “risk . . . 
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care”149 by requiring 
that the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of “reasonable care.”150  
Courts have interpreted this factor to require only that due care eliminate 
the great risk of harm; the activity need not be made completely 
harmless.151  Consequently, plaintiffs often prove negligence in the 
alternative because, more often than not, some amount of care by the 
defendant would have prevented the injury.152  In other words, most 
accidents are avoidable.  Many courts, therefore, treat factor (c) more as 
an element than a factor because, in its absence, a plaintiff’s claim 
becomes tantamount to negligence.153 
Finally, section 520 is notable for its retreat from enterprise liability.  
As comment j of the Second Restatement explains, “[i]f these activities 
are of sufficient value to the community . . . they may not be regarded as 
abnormally dangerous.”154  Comment j echoes the holding in Losee that 
the benefits of the enterprise compensate accident victims for their 
                                                          
 145. See id. § 520 cmt. f (“In determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors listed in 
[subsections] (a) to (f) . . . are all to be considered, and are all of importance.  Any one of them is not 
necessarily sufficient of itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required for 
strict liability.”). 
 146. See Boston, supra note 103, at 629 (“[F]actor (f) . . . finds little historical basis and even 
less doctrinal justification.”). 
 147. Id. at 622, 629. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(c) (1938) (requiring as an element of ultrahazardous 
activity the inability to eliminate the risk of serious harm with use of utmost care). 
 150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c). 
 151. See, e.g., New Meadows Holding Co. v. Wash. Water Power Co., 687 P.2d 212, 216 (Wash. 
1984) (en banc) (holding that exercise of reasonable care eliminated the “high degree of risk” caused 
by gas transportation, and that it was unnecessary to eliminate all risk). 
 152. See Boston, supra note 103, at 629 (noting that the plaintiff must prove some likelihood of 
harm, and the gravity of that harm, for both negligence and strict liability). 
 153. See id. at 630 (“It seems pretty clear that the availability of a [strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities] cause of action will be fairly limited because, in the vast majority of situations, 
a plaintiff will be able to prove negligence because some amount of care exercised by the defendant 
would have prevented the injury.”). 
 154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j. 
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accidental losses from it.155  Professor Boston argues that when courts 
moved away from enterprise liability, they eroded the need, and 
justification, for strict liability.156 
3. The Rise of Negligence as an Alternative to Strict Liability 
The third portion of this survey of strict liability law will review the 
laws of negligence and res ipsa loquitur.  It will summarize the general 
thrust of strict liability criticism, namely that negligence is a better 
standard.  Then, it will analyze the rule of res ipsa loquitur, which is 
sometimes considered a compromise between the two positions.157  For 
this Comment’s sake, one should view strict liability, negligence, and res 
ipsa loquitur as three points along a spectrum of liability, with res ipsa 
loquitur in the middle of the two extremes. 
a. Arguments for Negligence 
Some from the bench and bar have lauded negligence as an 
alternative standard to strict liability.158  An essential difference between 
the two torts is how each assigns liability for damages caused by 
unavoidable accidents.159  An unavoidable accident is “an occurrence 
which was not intended and which, under all the circumstances, could 
not have been foreseen or prevented by the exercise of reasonable 
precautions.”160  Strict liability assigns fault for unavoidable accidents to 
                                                          
 155. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484–85 (1873). 
 156. Boston, supra note 103, at 601. 
 157. See id. at 647 (noting that res ipsa loquitur obviates the need for strict liability).  Contra 
William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1735–36 
(1992) (arguing that res ipsa loquitur, though an alternative to strict liability, is an inadequate one). 
 158. See, e.g., Boston, supra note 103, at 598 (arguing that strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities is nearly extinct because courts have concluded that negligence “functions 
effectively to deter the serious risks posed by such activities”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning 
and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 607–08 (1992); 
see also Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The 
baseline common law regime of tort liability is negligence.  When it is a workable regime, because 
the hazards of an activity can be avoided by being careful (which is to say, nonnegligent), there is no 
need to switch to strict liability.”). 
 159. See Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 208 (1973) 
(“[F]requently the cost either to injurer or to victim of taking measures to prevent an [unavoidable] 
accident exceeds the expected accident cost and in such a case efficiency requires that the accident 
be permitted to occur.  Under a negligence standard, the injurer is not liable; under strict liability, he 
is.”). 
 160. KEETON ET AL., supra note 93, § 29, at 162. 
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the actor, regardless of blameworthiness.161  Negligence, on the other 
hand, assigns no fault for unavoidable accidents because no party is 
morally blameworthy.162 
                                                          
 161. Id. § 75, at 534. 
 162. Id. § 29, at 162. 
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Professor James Henderson summed up the vast body of strict 
liability criticism with four arguments that negligence is a better standard 
for assigning fault: (1) tradition; (2) promotion of safety; (3) distribution 
of loss; and, (4) adjudicability.163  Professor Henderson’s first argument 
is that negligence carries with it a “resonance of tradition.”164  The 
premise here is that negligence is the “baseline common law regime of 
tort liability”165 in the United States, and it has been for over 150 
years.166  Further, courts should apply a negligence standard whenever it 
is workable.167  According to Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in Indiana 
Harbor Belt Railroad v. American Cyanamid Co., negligence is “a 
workable regime” when an actor can avoid an accident by exercise of 
due care.168 
Second, Professor Henderson cites the ability of a negligence 
standard to promote safety.169  Strict liability’s proponents contend that 
the doctrine induces risk-creating actors to use greater care by placing on 
them the full costs of accidents.170  That means that risk-creators have an 
incentive to take measures to prevent accidents.171  Judge Posner has 
proposed that negligence induces the use of greater care as efficiently in 
the short run by incentivizing victims to choose firms that perform safer 
operations.172 
Third, Professor Henderson claims negligence achieves “a 
substantial measure of loss distribution.”173  Strict liability “distributes” 
all losses resulting from accidents to the defendant enterprise, making the 
enterprise tantamount to an insurer of all victims.174  That notion suffers 
                                                          
 163. Henderson, supra note 110, at 386, 391 (citing Schwartz, supra note 158, at 607–08). 
 164. Id. at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schwartz, supra note 158, at 607). 
 165. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 166. See Henderson, supra note 110, at 386 (citing Schwartz, supra note 158, at 607) (observing 
that negligence has been the primary tort regime for at least 100 years as of 1960). 
 167. See Ind. Harbor Belt, 916 F.2d at 1177 (discussing circumstances under which strict 
liability should not be applied). 
 168. Id. at 1177. 
 169. See Henderson, supra note 110, at 386 (noting that negligence can “discourage[e] improper 
harmful conduct”). 
 170. Jones, supra note 157, at 1707, 1779. 
 171. Posner, supra note 159, at 209. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Henderson, supra note 110, at 386 (quoting Schwartz, supra note 158, at 608) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 174. See id. at 380; see also Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197 N.W. 971, 972–73 
(Minn. 1924) (holding that an enterprise should insure victims from harms arising from necessary 
and dangerous activities). 
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from a deep flaw in modern times, namely, that “in most cases[,] . . . it is 
not the innocent victim who bears the loss, but rather an insurance 
company.”175  Modern victims may no longer need enterprises to insure 
them because they have purchased that service independently.176 
Finally, Professor Henderson argues that negligence is a more 
efficient and adjudicable regime.177  The boundaries of strict liability 
doctrine are indefinite, which causes two problems with respect to the 
adjudication of claims. 178  First, the law becomes inconsistent.  Whether 
an activity is abnormally dangerous is a matter of law.179  But, these legal 
questions generally turn on “fact-sensitive risk-utility-calculations.”180  
Consistent and economical dispute resolution suffers as a result.181  
Second, strict liability’s vagueness likely increases the cost of 
litigation.182  The doctrine’s indistinct parameters could expand the 
universe of possible claims.183  The result is more trials and more 
expensive trials.184  On the other hand, Professor Henderson argues that 
negligence is not susceptible to these adjudicability problems.185  
Negligence does not require courts to set boundaries with an open-ended 
reasonableness standard.186  Rather, the proximate-cause requirement 
acts as a bright-line limitation to possible negligence claims, thereby 
minimizing litigation.187 
b. Res Ipsa Loquitur as A Strict Liability Substitute 
Somewhere between negligence and strict liability lies res ipsa 
                                                          
 175. Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Minn. 1984) (en banc). 
 176. See Posner, supra note 159, at 210 (discussing insurance as another option for recovery 
from loss). 
 177. See Henderson, supra note 110, at 402–03. 
 178. See id. at 391; Klass, supra note 13, at 916–17. 
 179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. l (1977). 
 180. Henderson, supra note 110, at 391. 
 181. See id. (“But even if a strict liability system avoided self-defeating reliance on notions of 
fault, as long as the boundary descriptions are indeterminate, the disputes they present will defy 
rational, consistent resolution by means of adjudication.”). 
 182. Posner, supra note 159, at 209. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Henderson, supra note 110, at 402–03 (stating that “[n]egligence avoids boundary 
problems” and is “adjudicable”). 
 186. Id. at 391, 402–03 (arguing that strict liability’s necessary risk–utility calculations defeat the 
doctrine’s objective of reducing transaction costs). 
 187. See id. at 392 (“[S]ome further limitation [on strict liability claims], akin to the proximate 
causation limitation in fault-based liability systems, is necessary.”). 
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loquitur.  Res ipsa loquitur is a “transitional step” between the two 
standards.188  This has led some critics of strict liability to hail res ipsa 
loquitur as an alternative to strict liability and its supporters to condemn 
it as such.189  Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur—Latin for “the thing 
speaks for itself”190—the circumstances of an injury may raise the 
presumption of negligence against the defendant.191  Res ipsa loquitur 
shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that she was not negligent.192  
To receive this inference, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant 
had exclusive control of the dangerous instrumentality, (2) that the 
occurrence would not happen in the ordinary course of events absent 
some negligence, and (3) that the plaintiff did not contribute to the 
accident’s occurrence.193 
One court described res ipsa loquitur as “the creature of necessity” 
because “[i]t is imported into our jurisprudence to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice in those negligence cases in which the dangerous instrumentality 
is exclusively in the control of one charged with liability and in which 
there is secrecy or invisibility of the danger of which the outsider could 
know nothing.”194  In this way, res ipsa loquitur overlaps with strict 
liability, which imposes liability without evidence of fault because 
accidents tend to destroy such evidence and victims often lack 
knowledge and control of the activity’s riskiness.195  Some commentators 
and courts have found that res ipsa loquitur obviates the need for the 
strict liability doctrine.196  Some advocates of strict liability, however, 
find it an inadequate substitute197 because it is merely a procedural rule, 
                                                          
 188. 1 STUART M. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LOQUITUR § 1:9 (1972). 
 189. Compare Boston, supra note 103, at 647 (noting that res ipsa loquitur obviates the need for 
strict liability), with Jones, supra note 157, 1735–36 (arguing that res ipsa loquitur, though an 
alternative to strict liability, is an inadequate one). 
 190. CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 117 (2d ed. 1980). 
 191. SPEISER, supra note 188, § 1:1; see also Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 2 H & C 722, 727–28 
(establishing the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to compensate a plaintiff who could not prove that the 
defendant was negligent when his barrel of flour fell from a window and hit the plaintiff). 
 192. SPEISER, supra note 188, § 1:1. 
 193. Id. § 2:1. 
 194. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 857–58 (10th Cir. 1949). 
 195. See Jones, supra note 157, at 1735–36 (stating that “res ipsa [loquitur] tends to overlap with 
circumstances suggesting strict liability” particularly in cases of escape of water). 
 196. See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1178–79 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(arguing that a plaintiff could “overcome the destruction of the evidence” using res ipsa loquitur); 
Boston, supra note 103, at 647. 
 197. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 157, at 1736 (“[R]es ipsa is a highly imperfect substitute for 
strict liability, which does not require an inference of negligence, on the part of defendant or anyone 
else, and is not subject to rebuttal or rejection except on the very limited grounds afforded by 
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which a defendant may rebut by showing she was not negligent.198  Strict 
liability, on the other hand, is not rebuttable.199  As a practical matter, 
courts tend to apply res ipsa loquitur when they are not willing to 
embrace either strict liability or ordinary negligence.200 
III. ANALYSIS 
This Comment will now analyze whether fracking should be subject 
to strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities or, alternatively, 
whether a fault-based standard with a res ipsa loquitur rule is more 
appropriate.  It will examine section 520 to determine whether fracking 
qualifies as an abnormally dangerous activity under the Second 
Restatement.  Specifically, this section will compare application of each 
section 520 factor to fracking with application of that factor to analogous 
oil field activities.  These activities are comparable to fracking with 
regard to their location, methods and materials, and purpose.  Non-
oilfield examples will supplement the discussion where oilfield cases do 
not exist to illustrate a particular point. 
A. Factors (a) and (b): High Degree of Risk of Great Harm 
1. Combined Analysis of Factors (a) and (b) 
Courts tend to analyze the first two factors of section 520 together.201  
Taken together, the factors require that the harm threatened “be major in 
degree, and sufficiently serious in its possible consequences to justify 
holding the defendant strictly responsible for subjecting others to an 
unusual risk.  It is not enough that there is a recognizable risk of some 
relatively slight harm . . . .”202  Further, “[i]f the potential harm is 
                                                                                                                       
specified defenses.”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1735–36. 
 200. VANDALL, supra note 92, at 10. 
 201. See, e.g., Anderson v. Farmland Indus., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198–99 (D. Kan. 2001) 
(analyzing factors (a) and (b) together under of the section 520 test); see also Yslava v. Hughes 
Aircraft Co., No. CIV-91-525-TUC-ROS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17228, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 26, 
1998) (“The first two factors are substantially similar and both parties, as well as many courts, 
analyze these factors together.  This court will do the same.”).  The factors are so substantially 
similar that even the Restatement’s comments analyze them together.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 520 cmt. g (1977). 
 202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. g. 
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sufficiently great . . . , [then] the likelihood that it will take place may be 
comparatively slight and yet the activity be regarded as abnormally 
dangerous.”203  The Restatement’s comment g cites a nuclear explosion 
as an example of a great harm.204  According to Professor Boston, factors 
(a) and (b), though not usually dispositive by themselves, tend to weigh 
more heavily in courts’ applications of section 520.205 
a. Great Harm 
Two Kansas cases discuss the great harm factor of section 520 in 
situations comparable to fracking.  The district court in Anderson v. 
Farmland Industries, applying factors (a) and (b), held that an oil 
refinery was not abnormally dangerous.206  The plaintiffs in Anderson 
sued under a theory of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities207 and alleged that certain gases in the refinery’s emissions 
posed human health risks when present in sufficient concentrations.208  
The court disagreed.209  Noting that “‘some’ harm” could result from the 
refinery’s emissions, the Anderson court held that plaintiffs failed to 
show a “high degree of risk of [such] harm or that the harm [would] be 
great.”210 
The Anderson plaintiffs suffered from two shortcomings.  First, they 
could not show that the harmful gases complained of presented a high 
enough risk of harm.211  Second, though plaintiffs did submit evidence 
that the refinery’s emissions frequently contained harmful gases, proof of 
frequency without proof of seriousness of the potential harm fails the 
factors (a) and (b) requirements.212 
The decision in Anderson has an important implication for fracking’s 
status under factors (a) and (b)—the fact that that frac fluid merely 
contains possibly harmful chemicals is likely insufficient to satisfy 
factors (a) and (b).  For those chemicals to create a high degree of risk of 
                                                          
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See Boston, supra note 103, at 622, 629 (noting that, along with factor (c), factors (a) and 
(b) are primary, while factors (d), (e), and (f) are secondary). 
 206. 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1198, 1201. 
 207. Id. at 1194. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 1198. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1198–99. 
 212. Id. 
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a great harm, they must exist in harmful concentrations in frac fluid.  
Frac fluid contains low, diluted concentrations of chemicals whose 
effects are further mitigated by dispersion, diffusion, adsorption, and 
biodegradation.213  Further, fracking operations actively retrieve released 
frac fluids214—a precaution that oil refineries do not take. 
The Kansas Supreme Court also has held that a natural gas drilling 
operation does not pose a risk of significant harm to drinking water.215  In 
the 1987 case of Williams v. Amoco Production Co., a landowner sued a 
natural gas producer for leakage of natural gas into underground water 
supply.216  The plaintiff alleged that the natural gas had come from 
defendant’s wells.217  In holding that the defendant was not strictly liable 
because natural gas production is not an abnormally dangerous activity, 
the Williams court accepted the defendant’s argument that 
natural gas . . . does not damage the fertility of the soil or growing 
crops; nor does it injure livestock or affect the quality of water.  This is 
true because natural gas is in solution in the water until agitated and, 
upon reaching the surface, dissipates into the atmosphere.  The 
presence of natural gas in the water-bearing aquifers has not resulted in 
an explosion, nor has it “polluted” nearby land or water . . . .218 
As in Anderson, the Williams court declined to hold that a substance 
benign in form and concentration creates risk of a great harm.219  
Moreover, the natural gas held harmless in Williams is the very same that 
allegedly contaminates drinking water from fracking.220 
b. High Degree of Risk 
In a case arising in Arizona, one federal court refused to find a high 
degree of risk absent clear scientific evidence of a risk.221  In Yslava v. 
                                                          
 213. EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 4-3 to 4-4, 4-15 to 4-16. 
 214. Id. at 4-15. 
 215. Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1123 (Kan. 1987). 
 216. Id. at 1116–17. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 1123. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (M.D. Pa. 2010) 
(“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants improperly conducted hydrofracturing and other natural gas 
production activities that allowed the release of methane, natural gas, and other toxins onto 
Plaintiffs’ land and into their groundwater.” (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 221. See Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No. CIV-91-525-TUC-ROS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17228, at *9–10 (D. Ariz. June 26, 1998) (holding that defendants were not on notice of 
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Hughes Aircraft Co., the district court heard a strict liability claim by a 
group of residents against an aircraft manufacturer.222  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendant contaminated nearby groundwater by 
disposing of a solvent called trichloroethylene (TCE) directly onto the 
ground.223  Applying section 520 factors (a) and (b), the Yslava court 
held that defendant’s activity did not create a high degree of risk of harm 
because the scientific community, at the time of the activity, believed 
that ground disposal of TCE was safe.224 
A notion of fairness to the defendant appears to have informed the 
Yslava interpretation of factors (a) and (b).  The court disposed of factors 
(a) and (b) in defendant’s favor seemingly because defendant lacked 
notice from the scientific community that its activity created a high risk 
of harm.225  Nowhere does section 520 impose a notice requirement for 
strict liability.226  Indeed, it seems antithetical to the doctrine to let a 
defendant off the hook because it lacked knowledge of the risk caused by 
its activities.  The case of fracking, however, reveals some wisdom in the 
Yslava court’s application of factors (a) and (b).  Like ground disposal of 
TCE in Yslava, prevailing science currently considers fracking safe.227  
Whether and for how long that scientific paradigm will continue are open 
questions.228  It would be unfair, however, to consider fracking 
abnormally dangerous as a matter of law when prevailing science has 
only very recently and preliminarily doubted its safety.  When viewed 
this way, Yslava stands for the proposition that it is a matter of fairness 
that a defendant should be strictly liable for an activity that it has no 
reason to believe is harmful. 
The first two factors of section 520 appear to weigh against 
                                                                                                                       
trichloroethylene’s riskiness because contemporary prevailing science did not recognize that it was 
harmful to groundwater). 
 222. Id. at *1–2. 
 223. Id. at *1–2, 12–13. 
 224. Id. at *9–10; see also id. at *13–14 (referencing the affidavit of defendant’s expert witness, 
who testified that placing TCE on the ground and letting it evaporate was considered safe disposal 
by the scientific community). 
 225. Id. at *9–10. 
 226. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
 227. See EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, 7-5 to 7-6 (concluding that no evidence 
links fracking operations to degradation of underground sources of drinking water). 
 228. The EPA’s 2011 investigation of the Pavillion Gas Field has led the agency to believe some 
link probably exists between fracking and groundwater contamination.  See EPA USDW 
EVALUATION DRAFT 2011, supra note 75 at 33, 39 (suggesting that shallow pits may be a source of 
contamination and calling for more research).  Whether the theory can withstand criticisms of its 
validity remains to be seen. 
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classifying fracking as an abnormally dangerous activity.  Fracking 
probably does not threaten a great harm because, like emissions from an 
oil refinery, frac fluid does not contain harmful toxins in dangerous 
concentrations.  Likewise, it seems unfair for a court to find that fracking 
poses a high degree of risk because scientific evidence—at the present, at 
least—has concluded that it does not. 
2. Factor (e): Inappropriateness of the Activity to Its Location 
The authors of the comments to section 520 and many courts 
examine factors (a) and (b) in conjunction with factor (e)—the 
inappropriateness of the activity to its location.229  The authors 
apparently intended factor (e) to consider whether an activity constitutes 
a “natural use” of the land where it is conducted.230  The rationale for 
considering factors (a) and (b) with factor (e) is that certain activities are 
risky only when conducted in certain locations.231  For example, a large 
water reservoir in open country is not abnormally dangerous, but the 
same reservoir on a bluff above a large city is.232  In short, courts cannot 
determine the degree of risk of great harm of an activity in the abstract, 
but rather they must consider the risk in the context of its location. 
Courts nationwide have held that the operation of oil and gas wells in 
oil and gas fields is not abnormally dangerous.233  That was the result in 
Williams.234  The plaintiffs in Williams were landowners in the Hugoton 
Natural Gas Field of western Kansas.235  Their argument that defendant’s 
natural gas production was abnormally dangerous236 failed because “the 
drilling and operation of natural gas wells in [a gas field] is a common, 
accepted, and natural use of the land.”237  The Williams holding is 
                                                          
 229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. g. 
 230. See id. § 520 cmt. j (“This [factor] is sometimes expressed, particularly in the English cases, 
by saying there is strict liability for a ‘non-natural’ use of the defendant’s land.”). 
 231. Id. § 520 cmt. g. 
 232. Id. § 520 cmt. j. 
 233. E.g., Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1123 (Kan. 1987) (holding that “the 
drilling and operation of natural gas well is not an abnormally dangerous activity”); Charles F. 
Hayes & Assocs., Inc. v. Blue, 233 So.2d 127, 128 (Miss. 1970) (requiring proof of negligence to 
impose liability for damage caused by oil field drilling operations). 
 234. 734 P.2d at 1123. 
 235. Id. at 1116.  “The Hugoton field is the largest natural gas field in North America . . . .”  Tim 
Carr & Robert S. Sawin, Hugoton Natural Gas Area of Kansas, KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/Publications/pic5/pic5_1.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 236. Williams, 734 P.2d at 1121. 
 237. Id. at 1123. 
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comparable to other, non-oil field cases.  For instance, a district court in 
Kansas has held that manufacturing activities that use the chemical 
TCE—known at the time of the case to be dangerous—are appropriately 
located in industrial zones.238 
It is more contentious whether petroleum activities, like fracking, are 
abnormally dangerous when conducted near populated areas and 
aquifers.  Courts have answered this question in the context of petroleum 
storage tanks, such as those that hold gasoline under service stations.  
Though generally not held to be abnormally dangerous,239 gasoline tanks 
may become so when located near drinking water sources that serve 
population centers.240  Such was the 1993 case of Harthman v. Texaco, 
Inc., in which the court held that the underground storage of gasoline for 
a fuel station was abnormally dangerous because of the storage tanks’ 
location.241  The fuel station’s tanks were situated directly above a fresh 
water aquifer that served as the community’s primary drinking water.242  
The precarious location of the storage tanks was enough to increase the 
likelihood of harm, and make the potential for harm great, where it 
otherwise might not have been.243 
The common thread running through these cases is how location of 
an activity affects its riskiness.  It seems that when a petroleum-related 
activity occurs away from populations—and the aquifers from which 
those populations draw water—it is not abnormally dangerous.  Today, 
fracking, like the gas production at issue in Williams, typically happens 
in remote or rural areas, far from the drinking water sources of large 
populations.244  It follows that fracking does not create a high degree of 
risk of great harm when conducted in such an area.  The revolution of 
unconventional gas discoveries in states like New York and 
Pennsylvania, however, has opened up unproduced gas fields in areas of 
                                                          
 238. Greene v. Prod. Mfg. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (D. Kan. 1993). 
 239. See, e.g., Hahn v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., No. 94-5466, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 17528, at 
*1–2 (6th Cir. July 5, 1995) (affirming district court’s holding that Kentucky courts would not apply 
strict liability to the storage of gasoline); Arlington Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 
388 (E.D. Va. 1991) (“[S]torage and removal of gasoline in underground tanks is not an abnormally 
dangerous activity for which common law strict liability should be imposed.”); Hudson v. Peavey 
Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175, 177–78 (Or. 1977) (same); Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1995) (same). 
 240. See, e.g., Harthman v. Texas, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1243, 1270 (D.V.I. 1993). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 1269. 
 243. Id. at 1270. 
 244. See, e.g., EPA USDW EVALUATION DRAFT 2011, supra note 75, at 1 (discussing fracking 
operations in Pavillion, Wyoming). 
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denser population than western Kansas.245  The question is whether 
fracking in these new fields is appropriate, as it likely would be in the 
Hugoton field. 
At first glance, it would seem that if fracking occurs near populations 
and adjacent to an important aquifer—like the underground gasoline 
storage in Harthman—it might be likelier to cause a greater harm than if 
it were otherwise located.  The same could be said of fracking near water 
wells and surface water sources; perhaps, it even could be extended to 
underground plumbing.  It follows, then, that fracking would be 
appropriate in gas fields where no aquifers, streams, ponds, water wells, 
plumbing, or the like exist.  In other words, fracking may occur where no 
people live and draw water.  Under this view, practically no appropriate 
place would exist for fracking; however, the gasoline tanks in Harthman 
are distinguishable from the activity of fracking.  The issue of the gas 
storage tanks’ proximity to the community’s aquifer in Harthman is 
highly improbable in a fracking case.  Unlike the storage of underground 
gasoline tanks in Harthman, fracking occurs in underground formations 
that are isolated from aquifers by thousands of feet of formation rock.246  
Although sometimes performed in the same gas field as an aquifer, 
fracking is much less likely to contaminate the water source than the 
storage tanks in Harthman.   
But, assuming a court did find that fracking near an aquifer increased 
its risk of great harm, that finding might not dispose of the abnormally 
dangerous question.247  In Smith v. Weaver, the Pennsylvania appellate 
court found in 1995 that because of an underground storage tank’s 
location, it could cause great harm if the tank leaked.248  The Smith court, 
however, held that the activity was not abnormally dangerous, stating 
that “this one factor pales in comparison to the others [that] point in 
favor of our ruling that the storage of petroleum products in underground 
storage tanks is not abnormally dangerous.”249  As stated above, 
inappropriateness of the activity’s location is a mere factor, not an 
element, in the section 520 test.   
                                                          
 245. Greene, supra note 4. 
 246. ARTHUR, BOHM & LAYNE, supra note 49, at 2.  It is also true that coalbed methane fracking 
occurs at much shallower depths and often directly into an underground drinking water source.  EPA 
USDW EVALUATION DRAFT 2011, supra note 75, at 39.  This makes fracking much more 
comparable to the tanks in Harthman and possibly reverses the result of this analysis. 
 247. Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
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In sum, factors (a) and (b)—the high risk of a great harm—seem to 
weigh against fracking’s qualifying as abnormally dangerous because the 
dangerous chemicals in frac fluid are significantly diluted and prevailing 
science still considers fracking a safe practice.  Factor (e), on the other 
hand, favors holding fracking operators strictly liable when it occurs near 
populations and their sources of water. 
B. Factor (c): Risk Not Eliminated by Reasonable Care 
To apply factor (c) to fracking, this section will propose a definition 
of fracking, which has proved to be the threshold question in factor (c) 
analyses.250  It will then examine how courts should apply factor (c) to 
fracking by analogizing it to comparable oil and gas activities that courts 
have analyzed.  Finally, this section will discuss how res ipsa loquitur 
operates in cases of avoidable accidents and, specifically, how it should 
operate in a fracking case. 
1. Explanation of Factor (c) 
According to Professor Boston, factor (c) is the most important of 
the section 520 factors.251  This factor tends to be outcome-determinative 
in strict liability cases.252  The body of strict liability law as applied to oil 
field operations appears to corroborate that assertion.  Factor (c) refers to 
“the unavoidable risk remaining in the activity, even though the actor has 
taken all reasonable precautions in advance and has exercised all 
reasonable care in his operation, so that he is not negligent.”253  In 
application, according to Professor Boston, courts hold an activity 
abnormally dangerous only when the residual risk is high or abnormal.254  
In essence, factor (c) examines whether accidents are avoidable or not. 
                                                          
 250. See Boston, supra note 103, at 649 (“[H]ow the ‘activity’ being evaluated is described by 
the court will greatly influence the outcome of the analysis under section 520.”). 
 251. See id. at 629 (arguing that factor (c) is often dispositive). 
 252. Id.  Put another way, “when this factor weighs in favor of applying strict liability, the courts 
will generally apply strict liability.”  Id. 
 253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h (1977). 
 254. Boston, supra note 103, at 639; see also New Meadows Holding Co. v. Wash. Water Power 
Co., 687 P.2d 212, 216 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (finding that reasonable care could reduce the risk 
associated with a natural gas line to prevent the application of strict liability). 
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2.  Defining the Activity at Issue 
How courts define the activity at issue is the threshold question in 
factor (c) analyses.255  The more generally a court describes an activity, 
the more likely it is to find that reasonable care can eliminate the 
activity’s high risk.256  Professor Boston notes that many courts define an 
activity in its “benign, pre-injury-causing condition” to avoid applying 
strict liability.257  In 1995, one Pennsylvania state court explained the 
task of framing an activity in similar terms: 
The [plaintiffs] would urge us to consider not whether underground 
tanks are abnormally dangerous, but rather whether underground 
storage tanks [that] are leaking a hazardous substance, are abnormally 
dangerous.  By so phrasing the issue the [plaintiffs] are seeking to have 
us view the results of the activity, instead of the activity itself.  
Although a dangerous condition may have later developed, or harm 
may have occurred, the proper focus is on the activity itself . . . .258 
Courts that define an activity by the harm it already has caused 
cannot help but weigh factor (c) in favor of strict liability.  Take, for 
example, the 1983 New Jersey Supreme Court case of State Department 
of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.259  In its application of 
factor (c), the Ventron court found only “[w]ith respect to the ability to 
eliminate the risks involved in disposing of hazardous wastes by the 
exercise of reasonable care, no safe way exists to dispose of mercury by 
simply dumping it onto land or into water.”260  The Ventron court could 
have defined the activity in its pre-accident phase as “disposing of 
mercury.”  Instead, Ventron chose the narrower definition, making its 
decision that the activity was abnormally dangerous seem predetermined. 
Drawing the distinction between dangerous substances and a 
dangerous activity has been problematic for courts trying to define 
activities.  In the 1990 case of Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v. American 
Cyanamid Co., the Seventh Circuit observed that “ultrahazardousness or 
abnormal dangerousness is, in the contemplation of the law at least, a 
                                                          
 255. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Boston, supra note 103, at 649 (“By defining the activity at the greatest level of 
generality, the probability of finding strict liability is reduced.”). 
 257. Id. at 652. 
 258. Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (emphasis added). 
 259. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983). 
 260. Id. 
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property not of substances, but of activities . . . .  Natural gas is both 
flammable and poisonous, but the operation of a natural gas well is not 
an ultrahazardous activity.”261  In 1983, an Indiana state court in Erbrich 
Products Co. v. Wills explicitly separated the dangerousness of chlorine 
gas from the dangerousness of manufacturing bleach from chlorine.262  
The plaintiffs in Erbrich sued a liquid bleach manufacturer under a 
theory of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity for 
accidentally releasing a harmful amount of chlorine gas into the 
surrounding outside air.263  The plaintiffs urged the court to examine the 
dangerous characteristics of chlorine gas.264  Where the Ventron court 
might have framed the issue as whether the release of chlorine gas into 
the air is abnormally dangerous, the Erbrich court defined it more 
broadly as “[w]hether the manufacture of chlorine bleach constitutes an 
ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity.”265  The Erbrich court 
noted that if it were to analyze the properties of the dangerous substance 
instead of the activity itself, then “any commercial or industrial activity 
involving substances [that] are dangerous only in the abstract 
automatically would be deemed as abnormally dangerous.  This result 
would be intolerable.”266  After analyzing the defendant’s manufacturing 
activities, the Erbrich court found that due care could have eliminated 
the risks of chlorine gas pollution.267  Put another way, it was an 
avoidable accident.  This result was no surprise because the defendant 
had been manufacturing bleach by the same basic methods without 
incident for over fifty years.268 
3. Factor (c) Applications in Oil and Gas Cases 
This section will discuss whether due care can eliminate fracking’s 
risk of great harm.  It will examine this question in the context of 
analogous oil and gas production activities.  Petroleum drilling, 
                                                          
 261. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted) (citing Cropper v. Rego Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (D. Del. 1982); 
Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1123 (Kan. 1987)). 
 262. See 509 N.E.2d 850, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (“We hold that the manufacture of liquid 
household bleach using chlorine gas is not an abnormally dangerous activity.”). 
 263. Id. at 852. 
 264. Id. at 856. 
 265. Id. at 853. 
 266. Id. at 856. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 852. 
SCHREMMER FINAL.docx 8/2/2012  11:38 AM 
2012] AVOIDABLE “FRACCIDENT” 1247 
servicing, transportation, storage, waste disposal, and waterflooding tend 
to occur in the same areas as fracking, require similar instruments, 
materials, and methods, and rely on the same actors.269  Also, the 
potential harms of these activities270 are comparable to those of 
fracking.271 
a. Well Drilling and Servicing 
Courts generally find that due care can eliminate the high risk of 
harm from drilling and servicing gas wells.272  Even jurisdictions that 
have called drilling gas wells an ultrahazardous activity apply a 
“reasonable care under all the circumstances” standard, rather than strict 
liability, to the activity.273  In 1991, a district court in Mississippi found 
that due care can eliminate the high risk of well servicing or “workover” 
activities.274  Plaintiffs sued after a defendant’s well blew out275 during a 
workover276 operation.277  The plaintiffs claimed that defendants should 
be strictly liable because workover operations are abnormally 
dangerous.278  The court gave this argument short shrift.  Noting that 
                                                          
 269. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 270. For a description of the harms alleged in cases of petroleum well drilling and servicing, 
transportation, storage, waste disposal, and waterflooding, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 271. See, e.g., Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704 (M.D. Pa. 2011) 
(summarizing fracking plaintiffs’ allegations that “pollutants and other industrial waste, including 
the fracking fluid and other hazardous chemicals such as barium and strontium, were discharged into 
the ground and contaminated the [plaintiff’s] water supply”); Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 
750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (describing the plaintiffs’ claims that the drilling 
operation “improperly conducted hydrofracturing and other natural gas production activities that 
allowed the release of methane, natural gas, and other toxins onto their land and into their 
groundwater.” (footnote omitted)). 
 272. E.g., Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1123 (Kan. 1987) (holding that “the 
drilling and operation of natural gas wells is not an abnormally dangerous activity”); Charles F. 
Hayes & Assocs., Inc. v. Blue, 233 So.2d 127, 128 (Miss. 1970) (requiring proof of negligence to 
impose liability for damage caused by oilfield drilling operations). 
 273. See, e.g., Hull v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 812 F.2d 584, 589 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying 
Wyoming law). 
 274. Bolivar v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 789 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (S.D. Miss. 1991). 
 275. A well blowout is “[a]n uncontrolled flow of reservoir fluids into the wellbore, and 
sometimes catastrophically to the surface.  A blowout may consist of salt water, oil, gas or a mixture 
of these.”  Blowout, SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY (last visited Apr. 22, 2012), 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=blowout. 
 276. A workover is “[t]he process of performing major maintenance or remedial treatments on an 
oil or gas well.”  Workover, SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY (last visited Apr. 22, 2012), 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/search.cfm?Term=workover. 
 277. Bolivar, 789 F. Supp. at 1375. 
 278. Id. at 1382. 
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workovers occur daily without incident and that sophisticated safety 
equipment significantly reduces the frequency of accidents, the court 
found that due care could—and did—eliminate the risk of blowouts from 
workovers.279 
b. Natural Gas Transportation 
Pipeline transportation of natural gas has given rise to numerous 
claims for strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.  Those 
claims often fail because of factor (c)—the ability to reduce harm 
through exercise of reasonable care.280  Courts tend to apply negligence 
instead of strict liability in gas transportation cases.281  For instance, in 
Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court declined 
to hold a defendant gas transporter strictly liable because natural gas 
does not escape and cause harm in the ordinary course of its 
transportation through a pipeline.282  The Mahowald court’s inference 
here, apparently, is that when conducted with due care, pipeline 
transportation of natural gas is not highly risky. 
c. Petroleum Storage 
Courts tend to find that the exercise of reasonable care can eliminate 
the risks of pollution from petroleum storage tanks.283  Cases of this type 
                                                          
 279. Id. at 1383 & n.15. 
 280. See Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (W.D. Mo. 2001) 
(“[T]he operation and cathodic protection of a petroleum pipeline is a routine and easily regulated 
activity.”); Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Minn. 1984) (en banc) (applying a 
negligence standard to gas pipelines, but creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence under res 
ipsa loquitur, because escape and explosion of gas does not happen in the ordinary course of the 
activity absent some fault); New Meadows Holding Co. v. Wash. Water Power Co., 687 P.2d 212, 
216 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (“[W]e believe the high degree of risk involved in the transmission of 
natural gas through underground lines can be eliminated by the use of reasonable care and legislative 
safeguards.”).  The courts in New Meadows and Mahowald cite numerous cases that applied 
negligence rather than strict liability to gas pipelines.  See New Meadows, 687 P.2d at 215; 
Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d at 861. 
 281. Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d at 861, 863. 
 282. Id. at 863. 
 283. See Arlington Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 390–91 (E.D. Va. 1991) 
(“Maintained, monitored, and used with due care, underground gasoline storage tanks present 
virtually no risk of injury from seepage of their contents.”); Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 
175, 178 (Or. 1977) (“[W]e cannot hold . . . that the risk of seepage cannot be eliminated by the 
exercise of reasonable care . . . .”); Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(“Applying these [section 520] factors to the situation before us, we conclude that the operation of 
underground storage tanks at a gasoline service station is not an abnormally dangerous activity.”). 
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often refer to the commonness of gasoline storage tanks as a reason not 
to apply strict liability.284  Though commonness of the activity is a 
separate factor in section 520,285 its frequent inclusion in petroleum 
storage cases has an important implication for factor (c) applications: an 
activity’s combination of commonness and infrequency of accidents 
implies that reasonable care can eliminate the activity’s riskiness.  
Storage tanks are quite common and do not frequently contaminate the 
environment; they are, therefore, generally not held to be abnormally 
dangerous. 
d. Disposal Wells and Waterfloods 
Courts seem willing to apply strict liability in cases involving 
disposal wells and waterfloods.286  Disposal wells are those in which 
oilfield waste, such as saltwater, is pumped or injected into underground 
formations.287  Waterflooding is a method of secondary oil recovery in 
which injection wells “flood” oil-bearing formations with water to sweep 
residual oil into the well.288  The complaints in these cases arise from 
saltwater and crude oil contamination of fresh water sources.289  As one 
court explained, these operations continually force water “through more 
porous rock and earth formations” and into fresh water aquifers.290  The 
continuous introduction of wastewater into formations with high 
permeability appears to focus courts on the high risk that waste and crude 
oil could migrate into fresh water reserves.  Because this high risk seems 
                                                          
 284. See, e.g., Arlington Forest Assocs., 774 F. Supp. at 391 (“[T]he presence and use of filling 
stations in and near residential areas is widespread and routine.  In fact, filling stations with 
underground tanks are commonplace in most communities throughout the country.”); Smith, 665 
A.2d at 1220 (noting that gasoline storage tanks are common in modern society). 
 285. See infra Part III.C (discussing factor (d), the commonness of usage factor). 
 286. See, e.g., Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The 
waterflood . . . introduced a risk of serious harm to the land of others [that] could not be eliminated 
by the exercise of care . . . .”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 371 P.2d 81, 82, 84 (Okla. 1962) (affirming 
jury instructions for strict liability for waterflooding). 
 287. Disposal Well, SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY (last visited Apr. 22, 2012), 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/search.cfm?Term=disposal%20well.  “Disposal wells typically 
are subject to regulatory requirements to avoid the contamination of freshwater aquifers.”  Id. 
 288. Waterflood, SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY (last visited Apr. 22, 2012), 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/search.cfm?Term=waterflood. 
 289. See, e.g., Mowrer, 518 F.2d at 661 (describing plaintiff’s complaint that “crude oil leaked 
into and contaminated the nearby fresh water well that supplied plaintiff’s domestic water”); 
Hughes, 371 P.2d at 82 (outlining the plaintiff’s allegation that as a result of defendant’s waterflood 
project saltwater polluted plaintiff’s drinking water). 
 290. Hughes, 371 P.2d at 82. 
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unavoidable given the continuous nature of the activities and the high 
porosity of the rock formations involved, courts often conclude that 
waterflood projects and disposal wells are abnormally dangerous.291 
4. Application of Factor (c) to Fracking 
This subsection will apply factor (c) to fracking first by proposing a 
definition of fracking.  Following Professor Boston’s advice to courts, 
the definition should focus on fracking’s benign, pre-accident phase: the 
pressurized injection of frac fluid into deep, dense subsurface rock 
formations—or simply, as the hydraulic fracturing of geologic 
formations.  In the context of factor (c), fracking appears to be more 
analogous to petroleum servicing, storage, and transportation than to 
waterflooding and disposal.  Unlike waterflooding and disposal 
operations, fracking likely is not unavoidably risky.  Whereas 
waterfloods and disposal wells continually pump contaminants 
underground, fracking is an occasional act.  Further, waterfloods and 
disposals intentionally inject wastewater into geologic formations with 
high permeability and porosity through which fluid migration is 
relatively free.  On the other hand, fracking occurs in very dense 
formations with low permeability through which fluid migration is 
constrained.  Therefore, the qualities that make waterflooding and 
disposal wells unavoidably harmful do not appear to exist in fracking 
operations. 
The common trait among petroleum drilling, servicing, storage, and 
transportation—which courts tend to find safe when conducted with 
reasonable care292—is that they are performed frequently and nearly 
always without incident.  Fracking is no different.  Like the workovers 
described in Bolivar,293 fracking is a daily occurrence in the oil and gas 
industry.  And yet, like gas pipeline and storage tank accidents, 
fraccidents that contaminate drinking water occur infrequently.294  
Additionally, courts’ inferences about storage tanks, gas pipelines, and 
gas well drilling and servicing operations could apply to fracking as well:  
                                                          
 291. E.g., Mowrer, 518 F.2d at 662. 
 292. See supra Part III.B.3 (reviewing holdings that drilling, operating, servicing, transportation, 
and storage activities are made safe when conducted with reasonable care). 
 293. Bolivar v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 789 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (S.D. Miss. 1991). 
 294. EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 7-6.  The EPA has theorized, however, 
that groundwater contamination in Wyoming’s Pavillion Gas Field was caused by fracking 
operations.  EPA USDW EVALUATION DRAFT 2011, supra note 75, at 39. 
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its frequent occurrence and nearly impeccable safety history imply that 
the exercise of reasonable care can eliminate fracking’s riskiness. 
5. Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cases of Avoidable and Unavoidable Oilfield 
Accidents 
When faced with a petroleum-related activity that is safe when 
conducted with due care, some courts apply res ipsa loquitur instead of 
strict liability.295  One such case involved a house explosion caused by a 
natural gas pipeline leak.296  In Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it refused to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction, even though 
the plaintiffs claimed strict liability.297  The plaintiffs in Mahowald 
argued on appeal that the defendant, a natural gas distributor, should be 
held strictly liable because of the dangerous nature of gas transportation 
operations.298  The Mahowald court disagreed because “[i]n the ordinary 
course of events, natural gas does not escape from gas mains in public 
streets so as to cause explosion.”299  The court stated that res ipsa loquitur 
was justified because the defendant had superior knowledge of the gas 
system, access to the individual actors involved with the system, 
inspection and control over the system, and responsibility for the safety 
of the surrounding community.300  In sum, the court thought that res ipsa 
loquitur better served equity.301 
In 1949, the Tenth Circuit analyzed res ipsa loquitur in the context of 
well shooting in E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Cudd.302  A 
predecessor of fracking, well shooting was a technique for enhanced oil 
recovery in which producers exploded nitroglycerin at the bottoms of 
wells to free trapped oil.303  Well shooting was notoriously dangerous.304  
                                                          
 295. See, e.g., Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Minn. 1984) (en banc) 
(noting that res ipsa loquitur is appropriate in natural gas pipeline cases despite plaintiff’s claims for 
strict liability); see also E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 858–59 (10th Cir. 
1949) (noting that res ipsa loquitur would apply to this well-shooting case but for the fact that 
defendant did not have exclusive control of the dangerous instrumentality). 
 296. Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d at 858. 
 297. Id. at 858, 864. 
 298. Id. at 859. 
 299. Id. at 863. 
 300. Id. (citing Metz v. Cont. Ill. Elec. & Gas Co., 207 N.E.2d 305, 308 (Ill. 1965)). 
 301. Id. at 859. 
 302. 176 F.2d 855, 856 (10th Cir. 1949). 
 303. HYNE, supra note 7, at 422–23.  Well shooting was astoundingly effective, but just as 
dangerous.  HOWARD & FAST, supra note 19, at 5.  By 1950, hydraulic fracturing had replaced 
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The Tenth Circuit found res ipsa loquitur to be inapplicable to well 
shooting partly because “the [accident] was not so uncommon or unusual 
that it could be said that it must have been the result of negligence.”305  
Res ipsa loquitur was not a proper standard for analyzing well shooting 
because the activity caused frequent accidents; in other words, well 
shooting was unavoidably risky. 
Res ipsa loquitur could be appropriate for fracking if the activity is 
held to be harmless in the ordinary course of events.  Certainly there is 
no evidence that fraccidents are as commonplace as well shooting 
accidents.306  If fraccidents are held to be avoidable, like gas pipeline 
accidents have been, then equity would seem to require a fault-based 
standard in fracking cases.  Furthermore, like the gas distributor in 
Mahowald, fracking defendants inspect and control—and otherwise 
possess superior knowledge of, access to, and responsibility for—their 
fracking operations.  The result is that plaintiffs in fracking cases lack 
knowledge and control, which could justify application of res ipsa 
loquitur.  Basically, the doctrine could avoid a harsh result for plaintiffs 
by imposing the burden of proof on the party with superior knowledge—
the fracking operator. 
C. Factor (d): Extent to Which the Activity is Not a Matter of Common 
Usage 
Factors (d), (e), and (f)—the extent to which the activity is not 
common, the inappropriateness of the activity’s location, and the extent 
to which the activity’s value to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerousness, respectively—are difficult to analyze individually and, 
according to Professor Boston, are rarely outcome-determinative.307  
Factor (d), in particular, tends to have a broad definition, which could 
diminish its usefulness to courts.  Section 520 of the Second Restatement 
considers an activity to be a matter of common usage “if it is customarily 
carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the 
community.”308  Comment i of section 520 uses the operation of oil wells 
                                                                                                                       
explosive fracturing as the preferred method of stimulation.  Id. 
 304. HYNE, supra note 7, at 424. 
 305. Cudd, 176 F.2d at 858. 
 306. See EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 7-5 (concluding that fracking is not 
sufficiently dangerous to warrant further study). 
 307. Boston, supra note 103, at 629. 
 308. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (1977). 
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as an example of an activity that is not a matter of common usage.309  
The example specifies that “the dangers incident to the operation are 
characteristic of oil lands and not of lands in general.”310  Certainly, oil 
operations are not customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind, 
either. 
Courts seem to stray from the Restatement’s guidance when applying 
factor (d).  Rather than compare the activity to the actions of “the great 
mass of mankind” or “lands in general” to determine commonness of 
usage, courts often compare the activity to what others in the same 
industry and vicinity do.  The Fifth Circuit compared an activity in such 
a way in Sprankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chemical Co.311  There, the 
court decided that the storage of the fertilizer anhydrous ammonia was 
not abnormally dangerous.312  Sprankle held that “since anhydrous 
ammonia is commonly used in a wide variety of agricultural, industrial, 
and commercial applications, its storage, even in large quantities, can 
hardly be said to be ‘not a matter of common usage.’”313  There, 
anhydrous ammonia’s use in agricultural, industrial, and commercial 
contexts was sufficient to make it a matter of common usage under factor 
(d).314  Similarly, the court in Williams v. Amoco Production Co.—
discussed above in reference to an activity’s great harm315—held that the 
drilling and operation of natural gas wells was a matter of common usage 
because it occurred in an established gas field where other similar 
activities were common.316  Neither court considered whether the activity 
was common to all mankind. 
Of course, most of the world’s people do not frac.  Fracking, 
however, is much more common in particular industrial and commercial 
contexts.317  Just as in Sprankle, where the court held anhydrous 
ammonia to be common within the meaning of factor (d) because of its 
wide agricultural use,318 courts could consider fracking to be common 
because of its wide oilfield use.  Likewise, fracking occurs in oil and gas 
                                                          
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. 824 F.2d 409, 415–16 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 416 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d) (1977)). 
 314. See id. 
 315. See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 316. Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1123 (Kan. 1987). 
 317. HYNE, supra note 7, at 425. 
 318. Sprankle, 824 F.2d at 416. 
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fields, just like the gas drilling that the Williams court found to be 
common under factor (d).319  Even though fracking is by no means 
“common to all mankind,” courts could reasonably find that it is 
common within the meaning of factor (d). 
D. Factor (f): Extent to Which the Activity’s Value to the Community Is 
Outweighed by Its Dangerous Attributes 
Factor (f)—the extent to which the activity’s value to the community 
is outweighed by its dangerous attributes—is the most maligned factor in 
section 520.320  Chief among its critics is Professor Page Keeton, reviser 
of Dean Prosser’s treatise on torts.321  Professor Keeton believes factor 
(f) is “irrelevant on whether or not a risk should be allocated to the 
defendant because of the dangerousness, as such, of the activity.”322  
Other writers and courts agree, and the factor is often not determinative 
of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous.323 
The Restatement describes factor (f) as follows: 
Even though the activity involves a serious risk of harm that cannot be 
eliminated with reasonable care and is not a matter of common usage, 
its value to the community may be such that the danger will not be 
regarded as an abnormal one. This is true particularly when the 
community is largely devoted to the dangerous enterprise and its 
prosperity largely depends upon it.324 
The Restatement’s comment k explains that oil or gas wells are not 
abnormally dangerous in Texas and Oklahoma, but they are abnormally 
dangerous in states that are less economically reliant upon the petroleum 
industry.325 
Courts tend to interpret “value to the community” to mean the 
potential to create jobs.326  Anderson v. Farmland Industries held that an 
                                                          
 319. Williams, 734 P.2d at 1123. 
 320. Boston, supra note 103, at 623–24, 627. 
 321. Id. at 627. 
 322. KEETON ET AL., supra note 93, § 78, at 555. 
 323. See Boston, supra note 103, at 629 (arguing “that factor (f) is not [appropriate for inclusion 
in the adjudicatory calculus]; and that, on examination, the decisions in the last thirty years support 
precisely that conclusion”). 
 324. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. k (1977) (emphasis added). 
 325. Id. 
 326. See, e.g., Anderson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201 (D. Kan. 2001) 
(discussing the significance of the jobs created by the refining activity when deciding whether it is 
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oil refinery’s value to the community outweighed its dangerousness, in 
part, because the refinery directly employed 325 people and indirectly—
through other companies that depended on the refinery’s business—
employed another 100.327  Likewise, in Greene v. Product Manufacturing 
Corp., the Court held that a metal fabrication company’s manufacturing 
activities benefited the community enough to justify its dangerous 
attributes.328  There, the court deemed the activity justified because metal 
fabrication was a necessary part of the aviation industry, which 
employed tens of thousands of workers in the community.329 
Insofar as value to a particular community means the potential to 
create jobs, fracking’s value is indisputably high.  A Pennsylvania 
newspaper reported that fracking created as many as 72,000 new jobs in 
that state in two years.330  The result was an increase in the state’s coffers 
of nearly one billion dollars.331  Measured indirectly, as in Greene and 
Anderson, fracking’s employment impact would likely be greater.  
Though factor (f)’s relevance might be dubious, it probably weighs in 
fracking’s favor if it weighs at all. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Fraccidents that cause environmental contamination should not be 
held unavoidable as a matter of law.  Fracking has been a common 
occurrence in the oil and gas industry for over half a century.332  Yet, the 
EPA’s own study of the issue has been unable to definitively prove a link 
between fracking and water pollution—at least for the present time.333  
As the cases show, an activity that happens frequently but causes harm 
very infrequently is not abnormally dangerous; due care can eliminate 
such activity’s potential for harm.  It would be inequitable to hold an 
                                                                                                                       
an abnormally dangerous activity). 
 327. Id. 
 328. 842 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (D. Kan. 1993). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Sam Shawver, Perspectives: Expansion of Oil, Gas Industry Could Mean More Jobs, 
MARIETTA TIMES (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.mariettatimes.com/page/content.detail/id/538695/ 
Perspectives%E2%80%94Expansion-of-oil%E2%80%94gas-industry-could-mean-more-jobs.html? 
nav=5002. 
 331. Greene, supra note 4. 
 332. See HYNE, supra note 7, at 425. 
 333. EPA USDW EVALUATION 2004, supra note 33, at 7-5.  But see EPA USDW EVALUATION 
DRAFT 2011, supra note 75, at 39 (theorizing a link between fracking and groundwater 
contamination based on an investigation of one gas field in Wyoming). 
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enterprise strictly liable for conducting an activity that is empirically 
safe. 
Moreover, fracking is a natural and common use of the land.  By the 
standards of a number of U.S. courts, it is natural to extract oil and gas 
from oil and gas lands.  That fact assumes that extraction activities are 
matters of common usage, too, as that term is defined by an activity’s 
vicinity.  Finally, fracking employs local people at high rates, which is 
sufficiently valuable to offset a significant part of the activity’s residual 
risk.  Therefore, the section 520 factors probably weigh against finding 
that fracking is an abnormally dangerous activity.  This conclusion does 
not foreclose the possibility of fraccidents.  It is neither this Comment’s 
argument, nor the Second Restatement’s requirement, that fracking be 
deemed completely harmless.  When fraccidents happen, courts should 
apply a negligence standard, and plaintiffs should seek res ipsa loquitur. 
Courts have found negligence and res ipsa loquitur appealing 
alternatives to strict liability in natural gas pipeline and well shooting 
cases.334  The key rationale in these cases is that accidents that do not 
tend to happen in the ordinary course of events absent some negligence 
should not be held to a strict liability standard.335  The foregoing analysis 
attempts to argue that this rationale holds true for fracking, as well. 
Not only is res ipsa loquitur appropriate in fracking cases, it is also 
useful.  Plaintiffs in accident cases often lack evidence of negligence, 
either because the accident destroyed it336 or because the cause was 
invisible or secret.337  The very purpose of res ipsa loquitur is to solve 
this problem.338 
Further, res ipsa loquitur carries with it the advantages of negligence: 
tradition, safety promotion, loss distribution, and adjudicability.339  
                                                          
 334. E.g., E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 857–58 (10th Cir. 1949) 
(noting that res ipsa loquitur would apply to this well shooting case but for the fact that defendant 
did not have exclusive control of the dangerous instrumentality); Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 
N.W.2d 856, 863 (Minn. 1984) (en banc) (applying res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff sought strict 
liability, and noting that the standard is appropriate in natural gas pipeline cases). 
 335. E.g., Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d at 863 (applying res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff sought strict 
liability, and noting that res ipsa loquitur is appropriate in natural gas pipeline cases). 
 336. See Jones, supra note 157, at 1735–36 (stating that res ipsa loquitur, like strict liability, is 
helpful to plaintiffs when evidence of negligence is destroyed). 
 337. Cudd, 176 F.2d at 857–58 (explaining that res ipsa loquitur is a remedy for plaintiffs who 
cannot know the secret cause of their injuries). 
 338. See Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 2 H & C 722 (establishing the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine to make a plaintiff whole who could not prove that defendant was negligent when 
his barrel of flour fell from a window onto the plaintiff). 
 339. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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Adjudicability is the most prescient.  Fracking litigation is becoming 
increasingly widespread.  Negligence is the better regime to adjudicate 
these claims efficiently because it avoids the obviously difficult and 
delicate fact-sensitive, risk-utility calculations over which this Comment 
labors.  Finally, and importantly, negligence tempers the temptation that 
plaintiffs might feel to drag deep-pocketed oil and gas companies into 
court with less-than-meritorious claims.  
This Comment’s position is intended as a compromise.  Res ipsa 
loquitur might not be entirely fair to defendants, but it is rebuttable.  Res 
ipsa loquitur is a concession for plaintiffs, too, in cases in which strict 
liability otherwise might have been available.  More broadly, res ipsa 
loquitur strikes a balance between enterprise liability and enterprise 
subsidy.  The merits of res ipsa loquitur seem to speak for themselves. 
